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Abstract. Several aspects are discussed of ‘Suite B Cryptography’, a new cryptographic
standard that is supposed to be adopted in the year 2010. In particular the need for flexibility
is scrutinized in the light of recent cryptanalytic developments.
1 Introduction
Securing information is an old problem. Traditionally it concerned a select few, these days it con-
cerns almost everyone. The range of issues to be addressed to solve current information protection
problems is too wide for anyone to grasp. Sub-areas are so different to be totally disjoint, but
nevertheless impact each other. This complicates finding solutions that work and is illustrated by
the state of affairs of ‘security’ on the Internet.
In the early days of the Internet the focus was on technical solutions. These still provide the
security backbone, but are now complemented by ‘softer’ considerations. Economists are aligning
security incentives, information security risks are being modeled, legislators try to deal with a
borderless reality, users are still clueless, and psychologists point out why. According to some we
are making progress.
To improve the overall effectiveness of information protection methods, it can be argued that it
does not make sense to strengthen the cryptographic primitives underlying the security backbone.
Instead, the protocols they are integrated in need to be improved, and progress needs to be made
on the above wide range of societal issues with an emphasis on sustainably secure user interfaces
(cf. [3]). But, assuming the situation improves on those fronts, we also have to make sure to stay
abreast of cryptanalytic advances that may undermine the cryptographic strength.
In this write-up a development is discussed that is triggered by ‘Moore’s law’: roughly speaking
the effective cost, i.e., taking inflation into account, of computing drops 100-fold every decade.
This affects the security of cryptographic standards, since they become a million times easier to
break over a 30 year period. So, irrespective of the actual security offered by a system as a whole,
the strength of the underlying cryptographic standards needs to be constantly monitored and
occasionally the standards need to be upgraded. We are now on the brink of such an upgrade.
Although we believe that this upgrade is timely and appropriate, there are several comments that
can be made. Those comments are the subject of this write-up.
The upgrade in question is Suite B Cryptography (cf. [13] and [14]). Assuming continuation of
Moore’s law for the decades to come and no cryptanalytic disturbances, replacement of current
cryptographic standards by Suite B Cryptography would extend the life span of our cryptographic
primitives by more than 30 years. That would provide cryptographic security beyond anyone’s
imagination – and most certainly completely out of sync with the true security that can realistically
be achieved when Suite B is integrated in current systems. Nevertheless, it is a lofty goal.
The first point to be addressed is the assumption about the continuation of Moore’s law. According
to several sources (such as [5]) this assumption can indeed be made for another three or four
decades. However, the cost decrease will no longer be achieved by greater processor speeds, but
by increased parallelization. The extent to which computational tasks can benefit from higher
degrees of parallelism varies tremendously. So far, cryptanalytic calculations are trivially and fully
parallelizable, since they mostly involve stand-alone processes that can be run in parallel with and
mostly independent of any number of similar processes. There is no reason to suspect that this
will change. It is therefore reasonable to take the full potential effect of Moore’s law into account
in our estimates.
Suite B was presented by the United States National Security Agency (NSA), citing [14],
to provide industry with a common set of cryptographic algorithms that they can use to
create products that meet the needs of the widest range of US Government (USG) needs
and
is intended to protect both classified and unclassified national security systems and infor-
mation.
Driven by their need for ‘Commercial Off the Shelf’ products, the NSA coordinated with the
United States National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to standardize the algo-
rithms in Suite B, stressing that there is no difference between the algorithms for ‘Sensitive But
Unclassified’ (SBU) and classified use. NIST extended Suite B with a few primitives for SBU use,
and recommends adoption of the new standard by the year 2010 (cf. [13]).
Although it is a US standard, it is likely to have worldwide impact. Both from an economic
and logistic point of view, it is hard to imagine that manufacturers or vendors would adopt
products that would be excluded from a part of the US market or that large corporations would
switch systems between continents. Furthermore, it remains to be seen if there will be demand for
products based on a wider range of primitives than included in Suite B.
Usage of a well defined set of cryptographic primitives reduces diversity of implementations and
incompatibilities and will, overall, facilitate communications. Thus, adoption of a worldwide stan-
dard could be beneficial. However, before doing so everyone involved should be aware of the full
range of potential implications. We are not in a position to provide any type of feedback on a US
standard that resulted from a collaboration between NIST and NSA. Nevertheless, we recommend
that all parties considering adoption of Suite B form their own opinion before committing to it.
The opening sentence of [14] reads, promisingly,
The sustained and rapid advance of information technology in the 21st century dictates
the adoption of a flexible and adaptable cryptographic strategy for protecting national
security information.
Although it is not explicitly stated, we assume that this is meant to imply that Suite B is both
flexible and adaptable. We interpret ‘flexible’ as a property of Suite B itself, namely that it contains
a sufficiently large variety of methods with similar functionalities to allow for immediate migration
from a possibly compromised method to one that is believed to be secure. Thus, an implementation
that contains the full Suite B is necessarily flexible. An example would be migration from one
symmetric key size to the next. ‘Adaptability’, on the other hand, we interpret as a property of the
implementation, namely that any of the main building blocks can relatively easily be replaced by a
better one. Replacement of a current cryptographic hash function by the (as yet unknown) result of
the recently launched NIST hash competition (cf. [12]) would be an example. An implementation
of Suite B may be complete without being adaptable.
In this write-up we present a high level view of Suite B and its NIST extension, and comment
on both. Our purpose is to raise the level of awareness about this to-be-adopted cryptographic
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standard. In Section 2 we discuss the security of cryptographic primitives. A summary of the new
standards is presented in Section 3. More details concerning Suite B and block ciphers, crypto-
graphic hashing, and public-key cryptography are discussed in sections 4, 5, and 6, respectively.
2 Background
The security of cryptographic primitives is measured in bits: k-bit security means that on average
2k basic computational steps are required for a successful attack. A ‘basic computational step’
depends on the primitive and the nature of the attack: it requires a number of machine instructions
that is a relatively small constant or that grows as a small function of k. Moving, for a given
primitive and attack, from k-bit to (k + 1)-bit security roughly doubles the effort required for a
successful attack.
Interpreting this in financial terms, attacking a fixed security level gets cheaper over time. Thus,
if a certain minimal attack cost needs to be maintained over time, the security as measured in bits
cannot remain constant. Its minimal rate of change must keep up with Moore’s law: per decade
the effective cost to mount a successful attack against a certain primitive at a fixed security level
drops by a factor of one hundred. With
1.5 ∗ 10 = 15 and 1001.5 = 1000 ≈ 210 (1)
we find that every fifteen years we need to add 10 bits to the security level if the same attack cost
must be maintained. This does not take into account the unpredictable effect of improved attacks,
Traditional implementations of cryptographic primitives are not exactly adept at changing security
levels. For some it requires ‘just’ larger keys, which sounds easy but is hard, if not impossible.
For others it requires a design overhaul, which requires lots of time and money and – worse
– consensus. In any case, changing security levels is costly and should be avoided unless the
risk of increased exposure becomes unacceptable. Recognizing this fact, and in an attempt to
have a ‘buffer’ against unforeseen (since unforeseeable) cryptanalytic progress, standards generally
prescribe security levels corresponding to attacks that can for a sufficiently long period of time
be expected to be prohibitively expensive relative to the value of the protected data. Despite this
precaution, it is unavoidable that every now and then this security margin drops below acceptable
levels, due to Moore’s law, cryptanalytic progress, or a combination of both.
At this point in time, and for quite a while already, industrial standards for cryptographic primi-
tives have been prescribing 80-bit security. The current cost of successfully attacking such primi-
tives is considerable. On a processing unit that would be capable of performing 1010 ‘basic com-
putational steps’ per second, an attack would require about 4 million years. Since virtually all
attacks are fully parallelizable, this would be equivalent to saying that a successful attack would
require a year on 4 million such units1. This is out of reach for the average miscreant, but not for
the very wealthy or state-funded ones. Worse is that in ten years the security margin will be a
hundred times smaller, which is too close for comfort even given our overly optimistic assumption
concerning the processing unit’s speed. This holds irrespective of the security offered by the ‘rest’
of the system: we should avoid a situation where attacking the cryptography would become the
most attractive way to undermine a system’s security. Combined with fairly recent cryptanalytic
progress that chipped off about 20 bits of one of the 80-bit primitives, we conclude that we should
adopt standards of a substantially higher level of security than 80 bits, while at the same time
overhauling the design of the actually broken one. Suite B Cryptography intends to do the former,
i.e., increasing the security level. This is set forth in the next sections. The required overhaul of
the ‘broken’ cryptographic primitive is a parallel development (cf. [12]) the outcome of which is
still uncertain.
1 For at least one current 80-bit security standard this estimate is off by a factor one thousand: according
to [1] a year on 4 billion machines is close to what one should expect.
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3 Suite B Cryptography
Suite B Cryptography comes in two flavors. The NSA original [14] aims for 128-bit security or more
and prescribes a single method for each functionality specified. The NIST version [13] is satisfied
with 112-bit security and allows greater flexibility in the choice of methods. With 112−80 = 32, a
112-bit cryptographic primitive is roughly 232 times harder to break than an 80-bit one. Because
232 is close to (210)3 ≈ 10003 and 3 times 15 years is about half a century (using (1)), it takes
about that long after the adoption of the new NIST standard before we find ourselves again in
the situation that we need to reconsider the security level. The NSA’s 128-bit Suite B would add
another 25 years, for a total of about 70 years. These estimates assume Moore’s law will hold the
next 5 (or even 7) decades and no cryptanalytic breakthroughs. Both sound unlikely, for different
reasons, so these figures should be taken with a large grain of salt. Nevertheless, as far as we can
tell now, security-level-wise either choice is adequate.





The last two functionalities are based on public-key cryptography and are therefore treated as a
single category in this paper. The three resulting categories are what we refer to in the title of
this write-up as the three pillars of cryptography. The next three sections discuss the three pillars
in more detail.
4 Symmetric Encryption
Two parties that share a key can use symmetric encryption to protect their communication. One
party uses the shared key to encrypt data and transmits the encrypted data to the other party. The
other party uses the same key to decrypt the encrypted data, which should result in the original
data. For anyone who does not know the shared key it should be computationally infeasible to
interpret the transmitted data; ideally this should require searching the entire key space.
To agree on a key to use for symmetric encryption, the parties first have to engage in a key
agreement protocol. This is discussed below in Section 6. Symmetric encryption is typically based
on stream ciphers or on block ciphers. Stream ciphers are not included in Suite B or its NIST
variant. Given the state of flux of stream cipher development and cryptanalysis, and despite the
efforts of the ECRYPT stream cipher project eSTREAM (cf. [2]), inclusion of any currently
still surviving stream cipher proposal would indeed have been premature. Thus, for symmetric
encryption Suite B and its NIST variant both rely entirely on block ciphers.
A key for a block cipher is a sequence of bits of some fixed prescribed length denoted by ℓ. Typically,
a key is chosen at random from the key space, which is either {0, 1}ℓ or a subset thereof. A block
is a sequence of bits of some fixed pre-specified length denoted by b. Typically b = 64 or b = 128.
Given a key, a block cipher treats one block at a time. Data of arbitrary length to be symmetrically
encrypted using that key therefore first needs to be written as a sequence of blocks. How this is
done, possibly including padding, and which mode of operation is used to process the resulting
sequence by means of the block cipher, is not described in detail in Suite B, but a link is provided.
These issues are also beyond the scope of the present write-up.
For any key in the key space K, a block cipher C is a bijection on the space of data blocks {0, 1}b:
C : (K, {0, 1}b) → {0, 1}b.
4
So, for any key K ∈ K and any data block B ∈ {0, 1}b
C−1(K,C(K,B)) = B.
Both C and its inverse must be efficiently computable. In practice this means one may expect to
spend a small constant number (generally at most 5, and rarely more than 10) of machine cycles
per bit to be encrypted or decrypted using a software implementation.
The NSA original of Suite B prescribes the block cipher AES (Advanced Encryption Standard),
a succinct description of which can be found in [11]. AES uses b = 128 and allows the full key
space {0, 1}ℓ for ℓ ∈ {128, 192, 256}. The NIST variant allows all three choices, implementation of
NSA’s original Suite B must include ℓ = 256, excludes ℓ = 192 ‘for interoperability’ (cf. [14]), and
allows ℓ = 128. Furthermore, the NIST variant also allows usage of 3DES (triple DES, where DES
is the abolished Data Encryption Standard with key length 56) with b = 64 and ℓ = 3 ∗ 56 = 168.
Given these choices, the question is if they live up to the expectations: does AES with ℓ = 128
indeed provide 128-bit security, does ℓ = 256 indeed provide more, and do the NIST relaxations
provide at least 112-bit security? As usual with questions of this sort, the answer depends on the
attack model.
Restricting to traditional attack models, the answer is positive: according to the current cryptan-
alytic state of the art, ℓ-bit AES provides ℓ-bit security, and 3DES provides 112-bit security (note
that 112 is quite a bit less than 3DES’ key length of 168). Examples of such attack models are
retrieving at least one of the plaintextblocks given just a number of ciphertextblocks (generated
using the same key, say), or retrieving the key given a number of (plaintextblock, ciphertextblock)
pairs.
There are more considerations, however. A first, relatively minor point is the following. Although
‘everyone’ knows that keys need to be occasionally refreshed, we have not been able to find in the
relevant AES standard linked to from [14] an explicitly stated firm upper bound on the number of
blocks that may be encrypted with the same key. This is slightly worrisome, as explained in the
next paragraph.
Let S be a set of (plaintextblock, ciphertextblock) pairs, all generated with the same key. It
is a well known fact that the chance that S contains the plaintext corresponding to a random
ciphertextblock challenge (generated using the same key) grows much faster than linear as a
function of |S|. This chance is already non-negligible for |S| ≈ 2b/2 (cf. birthday paradox), which
does not depend on ℓ. Depending on how one counts the ‘attack effort’, it may be argued that
AES with ℓ = 128 (and b = 128) provides the desired 128-bit security. Namely, if one employs
the ‘time’×‘memory’ cost model (cf. [23]) and one includes the time to generate S, then one is
so fortunate to get attack effort 2b/2 × 2b/2 = 2b = 2ℓ. For AES with ℓ > 128 (but still with the
unavoidable b = 128) or 3DES (with b = 64) there does not seem to be a way to argue that one
gets the desired security level. Actually, in all these cases the gap is considerable: for instance,
AES with ℓ = 192 or 256 requires the same attack effort 2128 as does AES with ℓ = 128, as
argued above. An attack of this sort against AES requires half a billion Petabytes of storage,
which is a lot but not undoable (for a fixed key a (plaintextblock, ciphertextblock) pair requires
just 128 + 128 = 28 bits, i.e., 25 bytes, of which about 264 are needed, i.e., a total of 269 bytes).
For 3DES the storage requirement is just 232+7 bits, i.e., 64 Gigabytes, which is very feasible.
Even with single-key encrypted Terabyte transmissions there is no serious trouble for AES. For
3DES, however, keys would need to be refreshed at least once every few Gigabytes, which may
become cumbersome for large volume transmissions.
More worrisome is the following point. One of the selection criteria for AES was good performance
both in software and hardware. Indeed, fast software and hardware implementations are available
on a wide variety of platforms. To the best of our knowledge, the AES standard does not prescribe
any specific restrictions on the environment or the circumstances under which any particular
AES implementation must be used, but leaves this to the common sense of the users. Obviously,
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‘others’ should not be able to access anyone else’s AES keys or be able to snoop around in
their AES processes while they are running. Modern operating systems provide all the access
control mechanisms to properly separate users from unauthorized others, with as perceived greatest
dangers weak passwords and sticky pads. Thus, even though employees may have access to each
others desktops, individual data and processes are neatly separated as long as all parties involved
keep their access credentials to themselves.
The concept of virtual machines takes this a step further, allowing companies to economize on
hardware by letting multiple employees share the same physical machine while giving each of them
the look and feel of their own personal desktop computer. Anyone using such a work environment
may, quite reasonably, expect that other users of the same physical hardware cannot access or learn
anything for which they are not privileged. Unfortunately, with all the fancy access mechanisms
and separation of processes and data, different users of the same piece of computing equipment,
currently share at least one important resource, namely the data cache. When current CPUs
switch between processes, the state of the cache persists, leading to inter-process contention for
cache resources. As a consequence it is, fortunately, not the case that different users can read each
others’ cached data, but users are able to observe parts of each others’ usage pattern of individual
lines of the data cache: not the contents of a certain cache line can be accessed, but just the mere
fact that a particular line of cache has been used can be observed.
The potential consequences of this leakage of meta-information vary from application to applica-
tion. AES depends heavily on data dependent table lookups. Therefore, the consequences for AES
of this type of side channel attack are particularly unfortunate, as shown in [15] for several differ-
ent realistic scenarios. Roughly speaking, if a miscreant runs a certain cleverly designed process
simultaneously with someone else’s AES process, the miscreant can retrieve the corresponding
AES key in a negligible amount of time, with trivial computational effort, and in such a way that
the owner of the key remains unaware of the attack – a far cry from the security level the unwitting
key owner had every reason to expect. So far attempts have failed to produce efficient software
implementations of AES that are not vulnerable to cache attacks. Another choice than Rijndael
may have resulted in an Advanced Encryption Standard that resists cache attacks.
The threat of cache attacks is taken seriously by the relevant industries. Intel is the latest large
processor manufacturer to provide hardware AES instructions (cf. [4]), following the lead of others
(such as ADM and VIA) who have had this for a few years already. Given their novelty, these
AES-on-chip implementations have not been fully scrutinized yet by the open community, and we
are not aware of side-channel attacks affecting them.
Despite this promising development, AES may and will be used in software. But, as far as we know,
no software usage restrictions or warnings have been specified in the standards, so uninformed
parties may find themselves at risk. Obviously, no standard can anticipate all bad use cases and
many important decisions will have to be left to the implementers and users. But problems that
may occur in applications or environments that can be considered, from all reasonable points of
view, as middle of the road, should be fully addressed.
5 Cryptographic hashing
A cryptographic hash function H of length h is an easily computable function that maps bitstrings
of arbitrary length to bitstrings of length h:
H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}h.
Since h is fixed there exist x, y ∈ {0, 1}∗ with x 6= y andH(x) = H(y). However, for a cryptographic
hash function it is assumed to be computationally infeasible to generate such x and y, a property
that is referred to as collision resistance. It is also assumed that H is preimage resistant, i.e., for
any s in the range of H it is computationally infeasible to find an x ∈ {0, 1}∗ such that H(x) = s.
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Finally, it is assumed thatH is 2nd preimage resistant, i.e., for any y ∈ {0, 1}∗ it is computationally
infeasible to find an x ∈ {0, 1}∗ such that H(x) = H(y) and x 6= y. Note that in the last case
existence of x can be expected but in general not be guaranteed.
The above assumptions are, more or less, the standard assumptions one will find in the literature
about cryptographic hash functions. It is not clear if these are all properties that a cryptographic
hash function should satisfy, but that would lead to a debate that is beyond the scope of this
write-up. Concentrating on the more practical issues at hand, the computation speed of crypto-
graphic hash functions is comparable to that of block ciphers, assuming inputs of similar lengths.
As far as computational infeasibility is concerned, finding a preimage or a 2nd preimage should
ideally require 2h ‘steps’. This requirement cannot be met for collision resistance because, due to
the birthday paradox, one may expect that collisions can be found in 2h/2 steps. Any h-bit crypto-
graphic hash function therefore has security at most h/2 as far as collision resistance is concerned.
There exist cryptographic hash functions that have much longer output lengths than suggested by
their resistance against preimage or collision attacks (i.e., 80-bit security against collision attacks,
but output length 1024, which is much larger than the 160 one would ‘expect’). Those functions
are mostly of theoretical interest and will not be considered here.
It is not always clear when a cryptographic hash function should be considered broken. Even when
collisions can be found in fewer than 2h/2 steps and (2nd) preimages can be found in fewer than
2h steps, the latter problem may still be computationally infeasible by requiring many more than
2h/2 steps. Though applications that rely on preimage resistance are in principle affected, the
protection should still be more than adequate. Nevertheless, even a ‘partial break’ of that sort
is a sign of weakness of the design and a forewarning that should not be ignored. Furthermore,
continued usage of a cryptographic hash function with just partial applicability is a recipe for
disaster.
That the above is not a purely academic discussion is illustrated by recent events, which we
briefly sketch. All common practical cryptographic hash functions are iterative and use theMerkle-
Damg˚ard construction with strengthening: roughly speaking, the input is padded with, among oth-
ers, its length and partitioned into 512-bit blocks, which are processed by a compression function.
It was proved that the resulting cryptographic hash function is collision resistant if the compres-
sion function is collision resistant. As it turned out, however, the iterative approach to crypto-
graphic hashing also introduces undesirable weaknesses. The most infamous one is Antoine Joux’s
disturbingly simple observation that 2k different hash collisions can be constructed based on k
compression function collisions (cf. [6]). Reflecting the complacent attitude towards cryptographic
hash function research, this was only discovered more than 15 years after the Merkle-Damg˚ard
construction was introduced. It immediately follows from Joux’s observation that concatenating
two cryptographic hash functions – a popular construction – does not result in a cryptographic
hash function that has substantially stronger resistance against collision attacks than the weakest
iterative one among its two constituents.
Matters were made considerably worse in the fall of 2004, when Xiaoyun Wang and her coworkers
showed how certain differential properties of the compression functions of many popular crypto-
graphic hash functions could be cryptanalytically exploited. In [19], [20], [21], and [22] a sequence
of attacks is described, making it devastatingly easy to find collisions for some cryptographic hash
functions that were already considered to be very weak (such as MD4), for the first time showing
collisions for MD5 (still widely used, but at that time already known to be weak), finding faster
collisions than before for SHA-0 (the replaced precursor of SHA-1, also known to be weak), and
showing that finding collisions for SHA-1 is easier than it ought to be (though still challenging). Re-
markably, some dismissed this work as irrelevant for practical applications, because all it achieved
were collisions between more or less random looking values. Later generalizations and extensions
made attack scenarios more realistic and threatening, a development that continues to the present
day. At this point certification applications of MD5 should be discontinued, and if usage of SHA-1
can be avoided (such as in implementation of newly designed protocols) it is advisable to do so.
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The cognoscenti immediately realized that something was seriously amiss when Xiaoyun Wang
presented her results. After the exuberant cheers following her Crypto 2004 rump session presen-
tation had died down, there was a clear sense of “now what?”. This can be explained by looking
at the historical development of the currently most popular cryptographic hash functions and the
demise of some of them. MD4 was an early 128-bit cryptographic hash function, quickly found
to be unsatisfactory and strengthened, resulting in MD5 also of length 128. Although weaknesses
emerged, MD5 gained widespread acceptance. To the present day MD5 is used in, among others,
certification applications. In the early 1990s the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) was proposed, based
on similar design principles as MD5, but of length 160. In 1994 SHA was unexpectedly withdrawn
and replaced by SHA-1 which is identical to SHA with the exception of a single change which
makes SHA-1 substantially more secure than SHA (due to a subtlety that the open community
only fully understands since 1998). The original SHA is now commonly referred to as SHA-0. In
2002, an extension of the ideas behind SHA-1 led to the new cryptographic hash function SHA-2,
more precisely to SHA-256 and SHA-512, of lengths 256 and 512, respectively. SHA-2 is the cur-
rent state of the art. SHA-384 (essentially SHA-512 truncated to 384 bits) must be included in
a Suite B implementation, and SHA-256 may be included as well. The NIST variant also allows
SHA-512 and the 224-bit truncation SHA-224 of SHA-256.
Given the development of cryptographic hash functions sketched above, this exclusive reliance in
the new standards on SHA-2 is understandable but, from an operational point of view, a bit odd.
It is understandable because the basic design principle of SHA-2 has been extensively studied, the
lighter weight earlier versions (up to and including SHA-1) are vulnerable, but SHA-2 seems to
be invulnerable to those attacks. It is odd for several reasons. In 2005, the same invulnerability
argument applied to SHA-1: after the MD4, MD5, and SHA-0 collisions had been announced
and at a point that SHA-1 had not been affected yet, NIST declared its continued full support
for SHA-1, only to be faced with an effective – and similar – cryptanalysis of SHA-1 a week
later. Given the track record of the design principle used, it is surprising that it still enjoys such
strong support. Another reason that exclusive adoption of SHA-2 in Suite B is odd is that, in
recognition of potential problems with SHA-2, NIST has launched an open competition for a new
cryptographic hash standard (cf. [12]). It would be appropriate to explicitly mention in Suite B,
or at the very least in the NIST version of it, that a new standard is forthcoming, so that good
citizens who adopt Suite B can prepare themselves for yet another change.
A third aspect of the unaltered choice of SHA-2 in Suite B is related to what the cryptographic
grapevine has to say about the competition and its outcome, and to the nature of the weaknesses
found so far. There seems to be fairly general agreement that the current understanding of crypto-
graphic hash functions is not up to par with what we thought we understood about block ciphers
at the start of the AES competition. If not at the design level (since, what do we really understand
about block cipher design?), then most certainly at the requirement level: not even NIST knows
what properties a cryptographic hash function should have (cf. [8]), and hopes that the pieces of
that puzzle will fall into place as a result of the competition. This needs to happen quickly, as
submissions are due in the fourth quarter of 2008. If a new standard will be adopted as a result
of the competition, according to the current schedule by the year 2012, how much confidence can
we have in a design that by then has been scrutinized for at most 4 years? How would that level
of confidence compare to the confidence one may have in well studied approaches after known
weaknesses have been addressed?
In an attempt to address this question, the main problem with current cryptographic hash stan-
dards seems to be twofold.
– Number of rounds. The iteration used in the compression function is not repeated suffi-
ciently often to obviate exploitation of differential properties.
– Message expansion. The way new message bits are dealt with offers inadequate resistance
against differential attacks.
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The second point has in the mean time been studied. In [7] better message expansion methods
are presented that entail only a small performance penalty and that allegedly offer resistance
against differential attacks. This could be complemented with a larger number of iterations in
the compression function. Because all current attacks against MD5, SHA-0, and SHA-1 become
obsolete when the number of iterations is, for instance, doubled (cf. [18]), this would address
the first point raised above. Thus, at the cost of making them about half as fast, all current
cryptographic hash standards can be restored to their originally intended security levels with
respect to collision resistance. A similar change to SHA-2 should address its perceived security
problem as well. An additional problem is caused by Joux’s multicollision trick, but if finding
collisions is infeasible to begin with, then that is not a big deal – as long as one understands that
concatenation of cryptographic hash functions does not buy much additional security.
Summarizing the above two paragraphs: we do not know precisely what we need or want, we know
that by the time the result of the NIST competition is announced it is too early to fully trust
the outcome if it is a new design, we can have reasonable confidence in slightly altered versions
of functions we are all familiar with, and integration of the latter would be a breeze compared
to incorporating a new method. The sole problems of the above naive approach – which can no
doubt be strengthened considerably by a few more simple changes – seem to be that it does
not address multicollisions and the slowdown by a factor of two. The cryptographic grapevine,
however, finds it unreasonable to expect the same speed from cryptographic hash functions as from
block ciphers and, to some extent, attributes the weaknesses of current standards to a misguided
desire to make them fast (cf. [16]). With these simple-minded approaches and given the issues
pointed out combined with the requirements of the marketplace, there would have been a more
sustainable alternative for Suite B to sticking to vanilla SHA-2. Research on cryptographic hash
functions is currently very active, but given the tight schedule of NIST’s cryptographic hash
function competition it becomes hard for a new standard to fully profit from new insights that are
currently under development.
6 Public-key cryptography
In symmetric cryptosystems each pair of communicating parties needs to share, and occasionally
refresh, a key. Bootstrapping and maintaining such a system is costly because it requires trusted
channels to exchange keying material. Also, it gives rise to cumbersome key management issues,
to keep track of the proper keys for each party one would be dealing with.
In principle key exchange, key management, and also encryption can all conveniently be dealt with
using public-key cryptosystems. Additionally, public-key cryptosystems can be used for an appli-
cation that was not envisioned in the symmetric cryptography world, namely digital signatures. A
very cursory description follows. The quadratic overhead of the number of traditional symmetric
keys is avoided by the fact that in a public-key cryptosystem each party has its own personal
key, as opposed to sharing a key with every other party it needs to communicate with. Each of
these personal keys consists of two parts: a private key and a public key, with complementary
capabilities depending on the functionality the key is used for. If used for data confidentiality,
the public part is used to encrypt, while the private key is required for decryption. If used for
digital signatures, the private key is used to generate a signature, the validity of which can be
verified using the public key. Obviously, this requires secrecy of the private key and, on the other
hand, broad accessibility of the corresponding public key. For either functionality to provide k-bit
security, deriving the private key from the public one should require ‘effort’ at least 2k.
Complications arise due to key revocation issues, the certification mechanism that is required
for public keys, and due to the fact that a single personal key should not be used for different
functionalities. These are beyond the scope of this write-up.
No proven and practical approaches have been published to realize public-key cryptosystems. All
practical systems proposed so far rely on certain hardness assumptions, the most popular of which
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are the assumptions that integer factorization and computing discrete logarithms in certain cyclic
groups are hard. In the former system, RSA, the private key essentially consists of two large
primes, and the public key is formed by taking their product. In the latter, a generator g of a
cyclic group G of prime order and an element h ∈ G together form the public key, while the private
key is the least non-negative integer x such that gx = h (assuming the group operation in G is
written multiplicatively): this x is called the discrete logarithm of h with respect to g. A large
community of users may use the same infrastructure provided by the public key parts g and G,
with each particular user selecting their own secret x and publishing the corresponding h = gx as
their public key: the probability of selecting identical key pairs is negligible, unless the group is
too small to provide adequate security. In RSA, however, no sharing of infrastructural key data
is possible: each user must select their own large primes, and publish their product (generally
referred to as the RSA modulus). In both cases keys can be efficiently generated.
It is unknown whether factoring an RSA modulus or computing logg h is required to break either
system, but doing so breaks it for sure. Thus, to assess the security of either system one needs
to know how the RSA modulus size and properties of G behave as a function of the desired
security level. In the case of RSA this boils down to a single question, namely how hard it is to
factor integers. Based on the current state of the art in factorization algorithms one can be led
to believe that a properly chosen 4096-bit modulus provides, approximately, 128-bit security. It
is more contentious that higher security levels of 192 and 256 bits are provided by 8192-bit and
16384-bit moduli, respectively (cf. [10]). The popular belief that 1024-bit RSA moduli give 80 bits
of security is questionable, the alleged 112-bit security of 2048-bit moduli is on the optimistic side.
For discrete logarithm based cryptosystems the situation is more complicated, because there are
many possible choices forG, each with their own peculiarities with respect to the discrete logarithm
problem. In all popular systems G is a prime order subgroup of the multiplicative group of a
finite field or of the group of points of an elliptic curve. A first, generic requirement is that the
cardinality of G must be at least 22k in order to obtain k-bit security. If G can be embedded in
the multiplicative group of a finite field then the cardinality of the smallest finite field for which
this is possible must satisfy very similar requirements as RSA moduli: for instance the smallest
field cardinality should be a 4096-bit number to get 128-bit security. That this not only applies to
the traditional finite field discrete logarithm problem but also to some elliptic curve groups, came
as an unwelcome surprise to some. As a consequence the affected curves, so-called supersingular
elliptic curves, were considered to be ‘weak cases’ (cf. [9]) and abandoned for regular public-key
cryptosystems. They have since been resurrected, with different parameter settings, because of
their applicability to pairing-based cryptosystems – a development that not only the authors of [9]
find ‘especially striking’.
Supersingular elliptic curves were not the only example were an initially trusted elliptic curve
discrete logarithm problem turned out to be easier than expected. Somewhat more surprisingly,
discrete logarithms in multiplicative groups of finite fields of relatively low extension degree (typ-
ically 30) also proved to be easier to solve than expected, due to their connection to certain
hyperelliptic curve problems. Generally speaking, however, and avoiding the published bad cases,
it is widely believed that there are no other security criteria than the two mentioned above: always
a 2k-bit prime order subgroup, and if the subgroup is embeddable in a finite field the latter’s char-
acteristic must satisfy the same requirements as RSA moduli. Given the current state of the art,
it would be inappropriate to cast doubt on the strength of properly chosen elliptic curve discrete
logarithm systems. It would also be wrong to give the impression that consensus has been reached.
For some people there is a lingering doubt, fostered by a variety of questions and developments.
To mention a few, if the subject had indeed been researched so extensively as claimed, why did
it take until 2007 before a classical and practically relevant elliptic curve parameterization (now
referred to as ‘Edwards coordinates’) resurfaced? What other ‘classical’ results are waiting to be
rediscovered? Is it not remarkable that in certain types of elliptic curve groups the decision Diffie-
Hellman problem is known to be easy, whereas there is no indication that this is the case in certain
isomorphic subgroups of multiplicative groups of finite fields – despite a snide comment in [9]. Also,
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one keeps wondering why a group that allows so much faster than generic point counting (cf. [17])
would allow just generic discrete logarithm computation.
Suite B prescribes public-key cryptosystems just for digital signatures and key exchange. It does en-
cryption using a hybrid scheme based on key exchange followed by symmetric encryption. Although
RSA and discrete logarithm cryptosystems both support key exchange and digital signatures (and
encryption), Suite B relies exclusively on elliptic curve based discrete logarithm cryptosystems.
Furthermore, it specifies a small, fixed number of elliptic curve groups to be used, of 256-bit and
384-bit orders providing 128-bit and 192-bit security, respectively. The NIST version not only al-
lows more flexibility for the group sizes but also for the elliptic curve choices. And, interestingly,
NIST allows 2048-bit RSA for both public key functionalities plus, for digital signatures, 3072-bit
RSA and the 2048-bit or 3072-bit versions of the US government’s Digital Signature Algorithm
(DSA). Furthermore, it allows the 2048-bit version of the traditional discrete logarithm based
Diffie-Hellman method for key exchange.
It may be argued that the NSA put all its eggs in one basket with its limited choice of parameters
for just a single type of public key cryptosystem. Most certainly, the NIST version of Suite B offers
a greater degree of flexibility, both at the level of public key cryptosystem and as far as parameter
choices are concerned. It is a matter of taste if a limited choice of curves is good or bad since,
as also argued in [9], leaving users freedom in elliptic curve parameter choices, which may sound
good, carries the risk of selecting poor curves. As far as Suite B’s restriction to a single system is
concerned, on the relevant website (cf. [14]) the following statement can be found:
A key aspect of Suite B is its use of elliptic curve technology instead of classical public
key technology. NSA has determined that beyond the 1024-bit public key cryptography
in common use today, rather than increase key sizes beyond 1024-bits, a switch to elliptic
curve technology is warranted.
This is not very informative because no reason is given why the switch is warranted. But a reason
may be that for the higher than 128-bit security level required by NSA it is unclear what parameters
would have to be standardized for RSA, DSA, or Diffie-Hellman. Furthermore, even if one could
agree on adequate parameter choices, their size would make implementations unappealing and
performance poor. Performance would also be a problem for 512-bit elliptic curve cryptosystems,
which is according to [13] one of the reasons those systems are not included in Suite B, the other
reason being that 192-bit security (as obtained using the 384-bit elliptic curve system) is adequate
anyhow. That this results in a remarkable security level mismatch in Suite B (with 128-bit and
256-bit block cipher security levels, but 128-bit and 192-bit public key security levels) is allegedly
not a concern, based on the argument that implementers prefer AES with 256-bit keys and that
this large key size does not incur a serious performance penalty over the 192-bit version (cf. [13]).
It will be a long time before the last word has been said about elliptic curve cryptosystems, their
security, and the particular curves selected for Suite B, unless an unexpected and for Suite B
undesirable cryptanalytic elliptic curve breakthrough occurs: if that happens the public key part
of Suite B would be dead. Systems that adopted the NIST version could survive2. Does the
risk of that happening warrant the additional cost of implementing two or even three public key
systems? That looks unlikely, even to some of those who, like the present author, recommended
against outright adoption of elliptic curve cryptography one or two decades ago – it is a relief
however, that Suite B did not jump on the pairing-based bandwagon yet.
Confidence in the security of to be standardized cryptographic technologies is obviously an im-
portant issue. But another important factor is free availability of the technologies in question.
Continuing the paragraph quoted above from [14]:
2 Unless the breakthrough has a wider effect. It could, for instance, involve the development, finally, of a
truly working quantum computer. We do not venture a guess as to when that may happen.
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In order to facilitate adoption of Suite B by industry, NSA has licensed the rights to 26
patents held by Certicom Inc. covering a variety of elliptic curve technology. Under the
license, NSA has a right to sublicense vendors building equipment or components in support
of US national security interests. Any vendor building products for national security use is
eligible to receive a license from the National Security Agency. For further information on
Elliptic Curve Intellectual Property Licensing please contact the Business Affairs Office of
the NSA/CSS Commercial Solutions Center. For further information visit: http://www.
nsa.gov/ia/industry/cep.cfm.
Although this begins promising, it is unclear where it leaves vendors that are not covered by the
terms of the license, but that nevertheless want to build a Suite B compliant cryptographic toolkit.
It is in sharp and unwelcome contrast to the other technologies standardized in Suite B, which are
free of intellectual property issues. Supporting its industry in the widest sense is implied by the
mission statement in the first quote in Section 1. Not doing so violates the intentions of Suite B.
7 Concluding remarks
Suite B’s proposed switch to higher security levels is timely and it allows a variety of security
levels that should be adequate for several decades to come. But Suite B is inflexible in the choice
of cryptosystems by limiting the standard to a single system for each of the three main func-
tionalities. The NIST variant is commendable for giving at least some choice in two of the three
functionalities, while also offering greater security level diversity. Suite B’s inflexibility would not
be a concern if the three main components involved are beyond reproach. One of them, however,
needs to be used with care when implemented in software (AES). This needs to be pointed out
explicitly in the relevant standard. Another functionality is based on a design principle that is
no longer fully supported by the cryptologic research community (SHA-2) and may be replaced
or complemented by the result of the NIST competition. This creates confusion, hesitation, and
potential incompatibilities, and may lead to costly upgrades. It could have been avoided. The third
(elliptic curve cryptography) is encumbered by patents until well beyond the year 2010.
Realistically speaking the cryptographic issues are a relatively minor concern. The societal aspects
surrounding information security are in much greater disarray than any of the current or future
cryptographic standards. There are many problems to be solved. To address those challenges, we
expect that psychologists will play a more important role than cryptologists.
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